ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
As sensors become ever more prevalent, more and more information will be collected about each of us. This wealth of data has many benefits, such as advancing medicine and public health, improving software and services through user pattern analysis, and enabling each of us to gain greater insight into our own habits and tendencies. At the same time, the potential for misuse of such data is significant, and simply the possibility that such data are being collected can "lessen opportunities for solitude and chill curiosity and self development" [1] . A long-term research question is how best to support beneficial uses while inhibiting less desirable effects. For emerging classes of technologies such as presence systems, addressing this concern is critical to adoption.
Figure 1: MyUnity Dashboard
Presence systems fuse physical sensing capabilities with social and communication software. Because sensor and presence data are sensitive, users" sharing preferences must be considered by the designers of such systems, especially for stored data. FXPAL"s myUnity presence system ( Fig. 1) , which has been in continuous use by more than 30 participants for over a year, was designed with these issues in mind. This paper describes the layer we added to myUnity to address many of our users" privacy concerns while enabling the benefits that come with storage and analysis of presence data.
Feedback from myUnity users indicates strong correlation between the extent to which a user is comfortable sharing data with a given person and how closely the user works with that person. Users were most comfortable sharing presence data with their closest colleagues, expressed some comfort sharing data with their direct manager, and much less comfort with higher-level managers. We recently performed a formal survey that confirms these observations more generally [2] . Our work supports an inverted hierarchical sharing structure that enables sharing of more detailed information with close colleagues, and less detailed information with people higher up in the hierarchy. This structure, which reflects collaboration relationships among users, is broadly applicable to social information sharing technologies.
In order to support collaboration in a wide variety of settings, presence systems must provide ubiquitous access to presence information. Therefore, a fundamental system design challenge is how to give users ubiquitous access on a variety of devices while also allowing them a high degree of control over and protection for their data. MyUnity users, for example, need access from mobile phones and tablets as well as laptops and desktops. For this reason, data must be stored by a third party, perhaps a server at their company or a cloud provider. To preserve privacy, and to enable the users themselves to maintain full control of how their data are shared, the data must be encrypted using keys controlled by the users and not shared with the third party.
In most instances, users are not interested in seeing raw historical data, only the trends derived from the data. A particularly useful case is when users are interested in statistics for a group of people. A high-level manager may be interested in statistics across all employees under her. An employee may want to determine times when people in the systems support group are less busy so she can ask an involved but not urgent question. Users of myUnity and participants in our survey [2] expressed greater willingness to contribute their data to group statistics than to share their individual values.
To support these needs, we developed a mechanism to maintain confidentiality of user data while enabling contribution to a statistic. We propose CollaPSE (Collaboration Presence Sharing Encryption) security in which,  at each time step, each member of a group encrypts her presence values under her own key. Each individual has full access to her own data,  a third party that stores this encrypted data can compute encrypted statistics, even over data encrypted under distinct user keys, without learning anything about individual data values or the statistic computed, and  entities equipped with the appropriate keys can decrypt the group statistics without learning partial statistics or individual values. We designed simple means to provide CollaPSE security for sums of time series data using off-the-shelf cryptographic components efficient enough to meet our real-time needs.
Because users are not always online, all of our protocols are non-interactive in that, after the initial setup, users do not need to communicate with each other to encrypt or decrypt time series data. Moreover, to compute, the third party does not need to communicate with users (other than receiving the encrypted values). The protocols use a symmetric-key, additively homomorphic encryption scheme [3] . The more sophisticated protocols combine this encryption scheme with extensions of Chaum"s DCnets [4] to provide stronger privacy guarantees. CollaPSE security complements differential privacy, which limits what can be learned from the statistics. The most significant contributions of this paper include:
 Definition of CollaPSE sharing structures that reflect the collaboration relationships among the participants.  Simple, non-interactive CollaPSE protocols for the case of sums over arbitrary subsets of time series data.
OVERVIEW OF MYUNITY
The past few years have seen a rapid expansion of technologies that fuse physical sensing capabilities with social and communication software. One such system is myUnity [5] , a presence system for the workplace that supports collaboration by increasing workers" awareness of their colleagues" physical presence, activities, and preferred communication channels.
MyUnity was designed to expand collaboration opportunities by building group awareness. MyUnity collects data from cameras, bluetooth device sensors, mouse and keyboard activity, network connectivity, IM availability, and the employee calendar ( Fig. 2) . At regular intervals, the data are aggregated and summarized into one of five presence states. A sixth state indicates there is insufficient data on the user. Users run clients that display presence states for colleagues as photo tiles within an awareness dashboard (Fig. 1 Presence System MyUnity provides means for each participant to tailor which feeds she will allow; a user can turn off any particular sensor feed whenever she likes. If, for instance, a user does not want a camera in her office, this data feed can be left out, and a presence state can still be computed. MyUnity uses fusion rules that adapt to missing information by degrading the system"s resolution of the user"s state. When a colleague is visiting a user without a camera, for example, the system will not report a visitor, but can report "In Office" if she is actively using her computer, or "In the Building" if she carries a detectable wireless device.
MyUnity users are interested in sharing their presence histories or trend data with their closest colleagues, but prefer that only aggregate statistics are available to managers and employees outside their team. This trust structure leads to the question of how to support a different type of hierarchical structure than is usually considered in the access control literature, one in which higher levels in the hierarchy have access only to summary statistics across a group of users, but do not have access to data for individual users.
To avoid concerns about misuse, the system initially did not store any data. Users consistently expressed interest, however, in seeing personal trends, activity patterns of coworkers, and data pooled across groups of users. They gave many examples of how access to historical data would support collaboration, such as knowing when a colleague usually returns from lunch on a Friday or whether the support team tends to have many visitors Monday morning. At the same time, users expressed concern about misuse if data were stored, and a strong desire for complete control over any stored data. Many were willing to contribute data to statistical analyses so that the designers could analyze the usage of the system or other users could get statistical information about a group as a whole.
MyUnity has been well received by its users, who have incorporated it into their daily routine to help coordinate collaboration with colleagues. A field study [5] showed an increase in face-to-face communication, most users" preferred means of communication, after adoption of myUnity. Nearly all users have continued using the system after the trial run. The popular press, while recognizing myUnity"s benefits in supporting collaboration, has presented a creepy view of the system with headlines such as "Someone"s watching you" [6] . Such a viewpoint illustrates that to achieve widespread adoption, presence systems must address user privacy concerns.
SECURED HISTORIES
Feedback from users indicates significant value in storing historical data, but only if secured and equipped with an appropriate sharing structure. This section defines the problem more precisely and describes components used in our solutions.
Problem Definition
We state more precisely the requirements for CollaPSE security: (i) at each time step, each user encrypts her own data under her own key, (ii) a third party can compute encryptions of sums over arbitrary subsets of a user"s data without learning anything about the values, (iii) the third party can compute encryptions of sums over data contributed by multiple users encrypted under different keys, and (iv) users with the appropriate set of keys can decrypt a sum without learning anything about the contributing values other than what can be deduced from the sum.
We formalize the problem in terms of the following players:
 n team members, each of whom has a value, such as a presence state, to contribute at each time step,
 an analyst who wishes to obtain a statistic over these values, and  an honest-but-curious third party who contributes to the computation without learning anything about the values. There may be one or more analysts. Analysts may be managers or may be one or more of the team members. We use the term in the formal definition so as not to prejudice which entities have those capabilities. A user may be an analyst for one group and a team member of another.
We define CollaPSE protocols for sums over time series data. From sums, many important statistics can be determined. To obtain the average, the user divides by the number of terms, which the user may know, or may be supplied by the third party. Because presence states in our case are Boolean values, the variance can be computed directly from the average: V = A  A 2 . In a non-Boolean case, the square of each value v i 2 can be encrypted and stored, and the decryption of the sum of such values, together with the average, gives the variance.
A CollaPSE security protocol for sums with respect to time series data contains the following algorithms: Setup: Establishes public parameters and constants used by all parties in the protocol. Generate Keys: Establishes the key structure. It is run once, prior to any of the data generation time steps. Encrypt: At each time step, each individual encrypts her values under her own key or keys and sends the encrypted values to the third party for storage.
Compute Encrypted Sum:
The third party can compute an encryption of the sum over any specified set of data. Decrypt Individual Sum: Any individual with access to individual A"s keys can decrypt the sum over an arbitrary subset of individual A"s values. Decrypt Group Sum: An analyst with the appropriate set of keys can decrypt the sum over all values, at a given time step, for a group of users. As we will see in Section 5, the "appropriate set of keys" with which the analyst can decrypt varies from protocol to protocol, as does the key structure.
A CollaPSE protocol is secure if (i) an honest-but-curious third party can learn nothing about the data values, (ii) an analyst learns nothing about individual users" values other than what she can deduce from the statistics, and (iii) each user learns nothing about other users" values.
A CollaPSE protocol for time-series data is noninteractive if, after the setup phase, the users do not need to communicate with each other, and each user only communicates with the third party to deliver the encrypted data at each time step.
A CollaPSE protocol is secure against k-collusion if for any set of k or fewer parties, whether consisting of team members, outsiders, or analysts, the colluding group cannot learn anything about another person"s data other than what can be deduced from the colluding members" data and the full statistic (if an analyst is part of the colluding group). 
Secured Histories Architecture
The system architecture ( Fig. 3) includes raw data sources, such as cameras, bluetooth device sensors, and keyboard monitors. These send their data, along with metadata, such as source ID and timestamp, to sensorinput processors that process the data and send it to the Feed Server. A video feed processor, for example, takes in raw video streams, but sends to the Feed Server only compact descriptions of events observed. In some cases, raw data sources may talk directly to the Feed Server. The Feed Server forwards data to the appropriate fuser, which computes the presence states.
The following components play a role in our protocols: TRUSTED (partial access to keys) Fusers: There is one fuser per individual. It has access to the keys used to encrypt its individual"s data. It computes its individual"s presence state from data received from the Feed Server, encrypts this presence state using the individual"s keys, and returns the encrypted presence state to the Feed Server, which routes it to the Encrypted Data Store. Client: A given individual may run multiple clients on different desktops or mobile devices. Each client has access to that individual"s keys, and the keys for any other individuals who wish to share their historical presence data with that individual. Clients decrypt and present information in the client interface, and pass user queries to the Feed Server.
UNTRUSTED (no access to keys) Encrypted Data Computation Engine:
The Encrypted Data Computation Engine computes on encrypted data and returns the results to the Feed Server to be sent to the clients. Encrypted Data Store: The Encrypted Data Store stores the encrypted data, together with its metadata. It also keeps a list of missing data ranges. When the store returns aggregated results, it includes a list, often empty, of any missing data. Feed Server: The Feed Server routes information between the various components of the system. Instead of having one fuser per individual, members of a team who trust each other could share a fuser. The untrusted components could reside in a public cloud. More than one of each of the untrusted components may be needed to support a large organization.
Underlying Encryption Scheme
To meet property (i) of the problem definition, any efficient encryption scheme could be used. Presence states are Boolean values, so schemes that encrypt Boolean values compactly will support more efficient storage and transmission. To meet (ii), any additively homomorphic encryption scheme can be used. Most homomorphic encryption schemes are public key schemes that do not encrypt Boolean values compactly. We selected Castelluccia et al."s symmetric-key based scheme [3] in part because of its compact and efficient encryption. Property (iii) is more challenging to meet, because most existing homomorphic encryption schemes do not support combining values that have been encrypted under distinct keys. Castelluccia"s scheme does support homomorphic addition of values encrypted under distinct keys. To obtain property (iv), we devised a complex key structure with which to augment Castelluccia"s scheme.
In Castelluccia et al."s cryptosystem, values are encrypted by adding a pad, obtained from a pseudorandom function and a nonce n t , mod M, and decrypted by subtracting it. More specifically, in our setting, let X i denote a user, where i is an index over the user population. Individual X i with key k i encrypts value v i at time t by evaluating a pseudorandom function g ki at nonce n t and adding it to v i to obtain
To decrypt, she computes g ki (n t ) and subtracts it from c i :
This cryptosystem is parametrized by a pseudorandom function (PRF) family, a collection F λ = { s : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} λ } of functions indexed by security parameter λ. Since provably secure pseudorandom functions are very slow, Castelluccia et al. [3] advocate using keyed hash functions such as HMAC followed by a length-matching hash function h that does not need to be collisionresistant, but must have uniform output upon uniform input. The simple hash function h : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} μ that partitions the λ-bit output of  s into length μ substrings and adds them together is an example of such a function. Applying such a function h ensures that if at least one of the blocks is indistinguishable from random, then the output of the composition of h with  s is indistinguishable from random. Applying h is unnecessary with a provably secure pseudorandom function. In [3] , the authors prove this scheme semantically secure:
λ is a PRF, and h : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} l satisfies {t  {0, 1}
λ : h(t)} is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} l , the above construction is semantically secure.
The simple h above satisfies the uniformity condition, so the security reduces to that of the PRF used. HMAC is a PRF provided the underlying compression function is a PRF [7] .
This cryptosystem provides the ability to combine values homomorphically that are encrypted under the same or different keys. Consider individuals X 1 and X 2 with keys k 1 and k 2 , respectively. They wish to encrypt the values v 1 and v 2 , respectively, at time t. Each encrypts by evaluating her pseudorandom function g ki = h( ki ) indexed by k i at n t :
Given the aggregate ciphertext c = c 1 + c 2 , an individual with access to both k 1 and k 2 can construct the sum r = g k1 (t) + g k2 (t) and recover the aggregate value
THE BASE PROTOCOL
This section describes a non-interactive protocol for sums over time series data that satisfies all of the conditions of CollaPSE security except that an analyst can decrypt the individuals" values. Section 5 extends this protocol to obtain full CollaPSE security, in which the analyst can decrypt only the sum, not any of the individual values.
Base Protocol Description
Each fuser computes, at regular intervals, the current presence state for its user and sends it to the Feed Server to send to clients. It encrypts each bit of a five-bit presence string separately in order to support computation of statistics restricted to one type of presence state. The fuser encrypts with the user"s key, taking the timestamp concatenated with the presence state type as the nonce. At each time step, the fuser sends a record, consisting of a user ID and timestamp, both unencrypted, and five encrypted Boolean values, one for each presence type, to the Feed Server to be placed in the Encrypted Data Store. 
where the nonce n j is the concatenation of the presence state type and the timestamp. We refer to r j = h( ki (n j )) as a pad. The record that is transmitted includes a header, containing the user ID and timestamp transmitted in the clear, followed by the five ciphertexts c j . Compute Encrypted Sum: The Encrypted Data Computation Engine adds ciphertexts mod M to obtain a ciphertext sum c.
Decrypt Group Sum:
A user with access to the keys for all users whose values contribute to a sum can decrypt an encrypted sum c by computing pads for all contributing values and subtracting them from c mod M. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 give example decryptions of a sum. In order to decrypt a sum, a user with access to the appropriate keys must also have access to the appropriate nonces. Because data are collected at regular intervals, users know which timestamps should contribute to the sum. In order to handle missing data, the Encrypted Data Computation Engine sends the client a list of any expected triples (timestamp, user ID, presence type) that are missing from the sum. Since the system is robust, usually this list will be empty or very small.
Example: Queries About An Individual
A user can query the Encrypted Data Store about her own history, receiving encrypted values that she can decrypt using her key. She can also query the Encrypted Data Computation Engine to receive encrypted sums. For example, she may want to understand her typical daily presence pattern by dividing the day into fifteen-minute intervals and requesting the totals of each type of presence state for each fifteen-minute interval over the past three weeks. The Encrypted Data Computation Engine computes and returns encrypted sums for each type of state in each interval. She then decrypts each encrypted sum using her key and the nonces. The semantic security of the cryptographic construction used to encode each presence state ensures that the Encrypted Data Computation Engine cannot learn any information about her presence states.
Instead of estimating her presence state pattern from the data over the last three weeks, she may wish to use data from the past six months, but weight the more recent data more heavily. After receiving the encrypted weighted sum from the Encrypted Data Computation Engine, she decrypts using the same weighting to sum the pads. As a simple example, suppose she wants to obtain the weighted sum v = v 1 +2v 2 , where v 1 is the sum over the earlier data, and v 2 the sum over the recent data. 
Example: Queries About A Group Of Users
Suppose each of L team members sends her key to an analyst. At a given time, and for a given presence type, all team members" values are encrypted using the same nonce n, a concatenation of the timestamp and the presence type. Each fuser encrypts its team member X i "s value v i by adding the pad r i = h( ki (n)) to v i modulo M: c i = v i + r i mod M. The analyst can request the sum from the Encrypted Data Computation Engine, which is
The analyst can compute the pads r i since she has all of the keys and knows all of the nonces. She can even compute the sum of the pads prior to receiving c from the Encrypted Data Computation Engine. She subtracts this sum,  r i from c to obtain the total v =  v i .
Advantages of this approach over having the client perform the computation after receiving, decrypting, and summing the contributing values include (i) more efficient bandwidth use, and (ii) improved security, in that raw presence values are not seen in decrypted form.
The amount of computation required to decrypt a group statistic scales linearly with the number of values contributing to the statistic, since the computation of the pads forms the bulk of the computation. The computation of these pads can be computed prior to receiving the encrypted value, so the part of the decryption that must take place after receiving an encrypted sum is constant: only one value, the sum of the pads, must be subtracted to decrypt, and this subtraction is much faster than a single decryption by a public key homomorphic encryption scheme. For this reason, comparison of decryption times for sums between our protocol and public key based homomorphic encryption schemes is not straightforward. For large sums, the computation of the pad sum is expensive, but can be computed ahead of time, prior to receiving the encrypted sum. In contrast, the decryption time for public key homomorphic encryption schemes is constant, no matter how many terms contribute to the sum, but decryption can start only after the encrypted sum has been received. In the extensions of this protocol given in Section 5, the cost of decrypting group sums does not increase with the number of users.
Application Of The Base Protocol
Our initial implementation supports the computation of a rough summary of a single user"s presence pattern from encrypted stored data. To obtain baseline efficiency estimates, we used presence data for one individual from a roughly three-week period. This test set consists of 31,568 records, collected once a minute, each with five encrypted values, for a total of 157,840 encrypted values. For the statistical summary of this person"s daily presence pattern, we aggregated the presence states over fifteen-minute intervals, and summed over the 21 days of data, to obtain histograms for each of the five presence states. We smoothed to further obscure the data and make it more visually appealing. Fig. 4 shows the graph our system produced. The colors are the same ones used on the tiles in Fig. 1 to indicate the presence states.
Figure 4: Graph Summarizing an Individual's Activity
History.
We implemented the core functionality in Java. We ported some of this code to our .NET clients. We used HMAC as implemented in javax.crypto and .NET with default security parameter λ = 128. We wrote a length-matching hash function that splits a byte array into groups of four bytes and adds these together. For convenience, we took M = 2 32 , so that each encrypted value is 32 bits, but we could have used a considerably smaller modulus. The bitlength of the encrypted data is an order of magnitude smaller than that needed by a public key homomorphic encryption scheme with a similar level of security. Thus, our protocol has more efficient storage and bandwidth usage than public key solutions.
We benchmarked our protocol on a virtualized Windows Server 2008 instance, hosted by a Citrix XenServer hypervisor, which was allocated four virtual CPUs with 8 GB of memory, an 80 GB virtual disk, and a 1 GB full duplex ethernet port. The underlying Intel Xeon E5450 hypervisor CPU runs at 3.21 GHz. Our clients vary, but our numbers are from an Intel 2.40 GHz dual core with 2 GB of RAM. We made no attempt to optimize the code. On our server, each encryption took roughly 2.33 milliseconds. Computation of all 480 sums, 96 fifteenminute intervals per day for each of the five presence states, took 439 milliseconds, or about 0.92 milliseconds per sum with approximately 2,105 contributing values. Computing the pads for decrypting all 480 sums is slow, taking 11.5 seconds total, but these pads can be computed prior to receiving the encrypted sum. The final decryption takes 2.33 milliseconds per sum, or 1.12 seconds for all sums contributing to the graph.
SECURED HISTORIES: COLLAPSE PROTOCOLS
The basic protocol of Section 4 enables an individual to use an honest-but-curious third party to store and compute on her data. The protocol enables a fully trusted analyst who has access to all keys to use the third party to aid in computing sums over values from multiple individuals that have been encrypted under different keys. This section extends the basic protocol to a series of increasingly sophisticated noninteractive protocols in which an analyst can decrypt only the sum, but not the individual values or any sub-sum. The more sophisticated schemes guard against k-collusion. As a side benefit, decryption of group sums is faster than in the basic protocol: the time for decrypting a sum in the protocol of Section 5.1 is constant, whereas in the basic protocol, it increases linearly with the number of values contributing to the sum. These schemes can be nested to support an inverted hierarchical sharing structure in which nodes at higher levels can decrypt sums over all nodes below them, but cannot decrypt any partial sums, including individual values. 
A CollaPSE Protocol
Suppose a project team wants a manager to see only pooled data on the team"s activities. The manager may see the pattern of availability of the group, for example, without learning anything about the pattern of any individual, other than what can be deduced from the statistics for the whole group. We describe a noninteractive protocol in which N team members X i encrypt one value at each time step in such a way that the manager can decrypt the sum but not the individual values.
Ideally we would solve this problem by providing the manager with a key k and the team members with keys k 1 . . . k n such that at each time step, and for each presence state, the pad computed from the manager"s key k is the sum of the pads computed from the team members keys k 1 , . . . , k n . We are not aware of a method for obtaining n pseudorandom functions g 1 , . . ., g N and another pseudorandom function  such that (x) = g i (x) for all x, with the property that the ability to compute  does not confer the ability to compute any g i . We take a less direct approach, using an extension of Chaum"s DC-nets [4] . Whether there is a more direct approach is an intriguing open problem.
The following algorithms constitute a CollaPSE protocol for sums with respect to time series data: Setup: Same as for the base protocol (Section 4). Generate and Share Keys: Each team member X i , for 1  i < N, generates a key k i , and the manager generates a key k 0 . Each individual member X i sends her key to individual X i+1 where the indexing is modulo N + 1 and the manager is considered individual X 0 . Encrypt: Each team member X i encrypts her value v i at time t by adding the pad r i1 = h(k i1 (n t )) and then subtracting the pad r i = h( ki (n t )) from v i ,
All team members use the same nonce n t , a concatenation of the timestamp with the presence state type. Compute Encrypted Sum: The third party can compute an encryption of a sum over any specified set of data. Anyone with keys k 0 and k N can compute pads r 0 and r N to decrypt c to obtain the sum v = v i . Sums over the group"s values at multiple times can be similiarly decrypted.
All players have two keys. The manager has keys k 0 and k N , and each team member X i has keys, k i and k i1 , as shown in Fig. 5 . The key structure is a chain in which pads computed from the keys cancel in the desired way in a sum. Because the manager does not have any of the other keys, she cannot decrypt any subtotal, let alone any individual value v i . To decrypt the sum, she needs to compute only two pads; thus decryption of group sums is more efficient for this protocol than for the basic protocol of Section 4.3.
A team member can share her data with individuals of her choice, such as close colleagues, by sharing her keys with them. A team may choose to give other outsiders the same keys as the manager, in which case multiple people can decrypt the statistic, but not the individual values. These examples illustrate that the hierarchical structure of the keys does not necessarily correspond directly with the access control structure, which is determined by who receives which keys.
A Family Of CollaPSE Protocols
In the protocol of Section 5.1, a manager cannot decrypt individual team members" values, but two players can collude to decrypt another"s data. Players X i1 and X i+1 can together decrypt team member X i "s value, where the manager is team member X 0 , and the indexing is mod N + 1. We can guard against s-collusion by increasing to s+1 the number of pads used to encrypt each value and distributing the keys in such a way that all pads except the manager"s cancel in the sum, and no subset of the s players knows enough keys to decrypt another member"s value. Setup: Same as for the protocol of Section 5.1, with the addition of a graph structure in which every team member and the manager has exactly s + 1 neighbors, for s odd. Generate and Share Keys: Team member X i generates keys k ij for every j < i such that X j and X i are neighbors. Team member X i shares k ij with neighbor X j . Encrypt: Each team member X i encrypts her value v i at time t by adding pad r ij = h( kij (n t )) for every neighbor X j with j < i and subtracting the pad r ij for every neighbor X j with j > i, where all arithmetic is done modulo M:
where χ i (j) is 0 for j < i and 1 for j > i. Compute Encrypted Sum: Same as before. Decrypt Group Sum: In a sum of ciphertexts over all team members at a particularly time, all pads cancel except for the r ij with j = 0. Since manager X 0 has keys k i0 , she can decrypt sums over the whole team.
These protocols generalize to support multi-level inverted hierarchies in which nodes at higher levels can decrypt only summary statistics over all leaf nodes below them, and cannot decrypt lower-level statistics or values.
RELATED WORK
Several commercial and research systems support awareness in organizations. Most provide awareness of a single channel of information. In systems such as Portholes [8] , workers observe the activity of co-workers via video feed. Fogarty and Hudson"s toolkit [9] used computer activity, ambient sound, and other sensors, to predict a person"s level of interruptibility. Other systems (e.g., [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] ) performed similar functions with different configurations of sensors. Most of these systems do not save past state, and none have adequate mechanisms for protecting and controlling access to historical data. Shared calendars sometimes provide control over how long data are retained and how historical information is accessed, and chat clients often provide user control over whether chat logs are retained. While we applied our sharing scheme to the myUnity system, our work could be adapted to work with other tools.
In Castelluccia et al."s [3] setting, data aggregation in wireless sensor networks, no data are stored, and a fixed computation is carried out as the data traverse the network. They have essentially one client, whereas we have many.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first application of their symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme outside of the wireless sensor network area.
Our approach differs from secure multi-party computation (SMC) in a number of respects. Our approach is noninteractive in that, apart from key sharing, which is done once prior to any data storage, and is only updated when sharing relationships change. After that, unlike in SMC approaches, all statistics are computed without the team members communicating with each other. All computation is done by the third party, not the team members, who do not even need to know what statistics are being computed. Our approach is not restricted to a single round of data, but rather handles time series data of arbitrary length without requiring further key generation or key sharing. Furthermore, our approach is substantially more efficient than general SMC constructions.
Molina et al. [14] study how to enable clinical research without giving patient records to the researchers. In their solution, caregivers, who have full access to patient records, use multiparty computation with public key homomorphic encryption to answer researcher aggregation queries.
Differential privacy foils deduction of individual attributes from data such as aggregate statistics, a concern complementary to our own. In the standard setting, the differential privacy mechanism is carried out by a trusted curator who has access to all data. Rastogi and Nath [15] provide differentially private aggregation of encrypted data using Paillier threshold homomorphic encryption to achieve differentially private aggregation without a trusted curator. Their decryption, unlike ours, is multiparty.
DISCUSSION
While the protocols of Section 5 were designed to support full CollaPSE security, they have the added benefit of reducing to a constant the number of pad computations needed to decrypt. For this reason, in large organizations in which statistics are desired over a large number of employees, it may be worth implementing one of the more sophisticated protocols of Section 5 even if an analyst is given all keys.
A number of residual risks remain. We were not concerned with protecting the integrity of the data. Because the encryption is homomorphic, it is malleable, so a separate mechanism, such as the one Castelluccia et al. [3] provide, is needed to protect against tampering with encrypted records. A more significant risk is that, from the release of aggregate statistics, individual values could be deduced. As mentioned in Section 6, differential privacy mechanisms address this threat. The simple structure of our schemes means that they can be combined with differential privacy techniques to support the computation of statistics with a differential privacy guarantee without the need for the individual contributors to share their individual values with anyone, including a curator.
To increase the minimum number of users who can successfully collude to decrypt another user"s values, the protocols of Section 5 require each user to use more keys to encrypt each value. An interesting open problem is how to support a structure in which a manager can decrypt an aggregate of all team members values, but none of the individual values, and in which no group of entities can collude to decrypt any other individual"s values. A related question, which would provide a solution to the previous problem, is how to construct n-tuples of pseudorandom functions {, g 1 , . . . g n1 } such that (i) = g 1 (i)+. . .+g n (i) for all positive integers i and where the ability to compute any one of the functions does not imply the ability to compute any of the other functions.
The current implementation does not use a third party provider, but its structure means that commodity cloud services could be used to compute on and store sensitive data. All untrusted components can be pushed to federated or external resource providers, which enables scaling to large organizations. Computation of encrypted sums is easily parallelized, so can be spread across different cloud nodes, or threads. Computation of the pad sum by the client is also easily parallelized to different threads.
CONCLUSIONS
We defined the requirements for CollaPSE security: that an individual has full access to her own data, and may obtain help from the third party to analyze it, that individuals cannot access each other"s data unless they explicitly share privileges, that the third party learns nothing about the data values, and that some users can obtain statistics about a group of individuals with help from the third party but learn nothing more about the data values beyond what can be deduced from the statistic. Such trust structures exist in many settings beyond presence systems, such as user studies, medical studies, and usage data from social networking sites. Our family of simple, noninteractive CollaPSE protocols provides controls that users of myUnity requested, and that are widely applicable in settings where there is a presumption of privacy or individuals have the power to opt out of data collection. As our implementation shows, our protocols are practical.
